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 INTRODUCTION  
The limited liability company (“LLC”) is a noncorporate business 
structure that provides its owners, known as “members,” with several 
benefits:  (1) limited liability for the obligations of the venture, even if a 
member participates in the control of the business; (2) pass-through in-
come tax treatment; and (3) contractual freedom to arrange the internal 
operations of the venture.  Because of this favorable combination of at-
tributes, the LLC has emerged as the preferred business structure for 
many closely held businesses.1 
                                                     
* Beirne, Maynard & Parsons, L.L.P Professor of Law, University of Houston Law 
Center.  
1 As one commentator noted: 
The [LLC] is now undeniably the most popular 
form of new business entity in the United States. . 
. .  Rising from near obscurity in the 1990s, the 
LLC has now taken its place as the new “king-of-
the-hill” among business entities, utterly dominat-
ing its closest rivals.  As the research reported in 
this article indicates, the number of new LLCs 
formed in America in 2007 now outpaces the 
number of new corporations formed by a margin 
of nearly two to one.  In several “bellwether” 
states, the numbers are even more impressive. . . .  
Other business forms have fared no better against 
the LLC.  While data for hybrid and newer busi-
ness structures is more difficult to compile, the da-
ta in this Article relating to limited partnerships 
(LPs) demonstrate that the LLC’s dominance of 
these entities is even more staggering.  For exam-
ple, the number of new LLCs formed in 2007 
outpaced the number of new LPs formed in that 
same year by a margin of over 34 to 1. 
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The LLC was the product of innovative professionals creating 
solutions when the legal system failed to meet client needs.  Hamilton 
Brothers Oil Company had been involved in international oil and gas 
exploration using foreign business organizations, primarily the Panama-
nian “limitada.”2  Limitadas provided limited liability for all owners and 
the ability to secure partnership classification for tax purposes.3  Because 
no similar domestic entity existed in the United States, representatives of 
Hamilton Brothers suggested legislation that authorized the creation of 
an unincorporated domestic entity that resembled the limitada.  An initial 
effort to obtain enactment in Alaska failed, but the same legislation was 
enacted in Wyoming on March 4, 1977, apparently without controversy.4  
The critical question then became whether the Internal Revenue Service 
would permit partnership taxation for an unincorporated entity that pro-
vided limited liability to all of its owners.  A favorable ruling on the ques-
tion was obtained in 1988.5 Once the tax issue was resolved, states quick-
ly adopted LLC statutes to take advantage of the flexibility of the new 
business form.  By the end of 1994, forty-seven states and the District of 
Columbia had adopted an LLC statute, and by the end of 1996, all 50 
states had done so.6 
                                                                                                                             
Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs are the New King of the Hill, 15 FORDHAM J. OF CORP. & FIN. 
L. 459, 459–62 (2010). 
2 See Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1459, 1463 (1998).   
3 See id.; see also Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability Company:  
Learning (or Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 922 & 
n.132 (2005). 
4 See Hamill, supra note 2, at 1464–65. 
5 See Rev. Rul. 88–76, 1988–2 C.B. 360 (classifying LLCs as partnerships for federal 
income tax purposes so long as certain criteria were met); see also Robert B. Keatinge, 
New Gang in Town, BUS. L. TODAY 5, 6 (Mar./Apr. 1995) (“In Revenue Ruling 88-76, 
the [IRS] . . . ruled that an LLC created according to the Wyoming act would be treated 
as a partnership for tax purposes.  The ruling marked a significant shift in the IRS’ poli-
cy with respect to entities in which the liability of the owners is limited to the owners’ 
investment.”). 
6 See Hamill, supra note 2, at 1476–77 & n.74. 
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Because of concerns that diversity in state law might create seri-
ous problems for interstate LLCs, attempts to develop prototype or uni-
form LLC statutes began after the LLC’s tax status was recognized.7  The 
rush by states to enact LLC legislation was underway, however, and 
many states enacted an LLC statute before efforts to develop standard-
ized statutes came to fruition.  As a result, LLC statutes tend to be less 
uniform than statutes governing other business forms.8 
One example of this non-uniformity involves the statutory 
grounds available to members who seek judicial dissolution of an LLC.  
This article catalogs each jurisdiction’s grounds and explores a few se-
lected issues raised by the diverse approaches.  Part I summarizes the 
methodology used and highlights the frequency of various statutory pro-
visions.  Part II analyzes two particular provisions—dissolution if it is 
not reasonably practicable to carry on the LLC’s business in conformity 
with its governing documents, and dissolution as a result of oppressive 
conduct by those in control.  With respect to the “not reasonably practi-
cable” language, the article argues that the impracticability of carrying on 
the business in conformity with either the certificate or the operating 
agreement should result in dissolution, but there is confusion over which 
statutory articulation is consistent with this result.  With respect to the 
oppressive conduct ground, this article provides some possible explana-
tions for why oppression-related dissolution statutes are less common in 
the LLC setting than in the corporation context. 
I.  THE STATUTORY GROUNDS 
To begin with methodology, I used Westlaw to examine the stat-
utory grounds available to members who seek judicial dissolution of an 
LLC in all fifty states plus the District of Columbia.  My searches were 
conducted over a one-week time period from August 7–13, 2017. I also 
examined the judicial dissolution grounds in five model statutes: the 1992 
                                                     
7 See id. at 1471 (noting “the formation of a working group to draft a prototype LLC 
statute” and “the solicitation of the Uniform Law Commissioners to open a study pro-
ject for a Uniform LLC Act”). 
8 See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1996) (prefatory note) (noting 
that “state limited liability company acts display a dazzling array of diversity”). 
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Prototype LLC Act (“Prototype”), the 2011 Revised Prototype LLC Act 
(“Revised Prototype”), the 1996 Uniform LLC Act (“ULLCA”), the 
2006 Revised Uniform LLC Act (“RULLCA”), and the 2013 Revised 
Uniform LLC Act (“RULLCA (2013)”).  Thus, my total sample was fif-
ty-six statutes—i.e., fifty states, the District of Columbia, and five model 
provisions.  Only judicial dissolution grounds available to members were 
examined; thus, grounds available to a transferee, the state, or the LLC 
itself were ignored (unless, of course, that same ground was available to a 
member). 
The most common judicial dissolution ground in the sample is 
when the court decides that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on 
the business in conformity with the LLC’s governing documents.  Fifty-
four statutes include some version of this language.9  Interestingly, this 
ground is articulated in several different ways.  Twenty-three of the fifty-
four statutes allow for judicial dissolution if a court decides that “[i]t is 
not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s activities in con-
formity with the certificate of organization and the operating agree-
ment.”10  Another sixteen statutes provide for judicial dissolution if a 
                                                     
9 See infra Appendix 1, 2.  Alaska and Kansas are the two statutes in the sample without 
some version of this language.  See id.  That said, Alaska allows for judicial dissolution 
when “the court determines that is impossible for the company to carry on the purpos-
es of the company.”  ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.405.  That ground is similar to the “it is not 
reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s activities and affairs” language used by 
three statutes that were included in the “not reasonably practicable” count.  See infra 
note 13 and accompanying text.  In other words, one might make a case for including 
Alaska in the “not reasonably practicable” count because its statutory language is com-
parable.  See also infra note 32 (noting that reasonable minds could disagree with some of 
the categorization choices made in this article).  
10 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 489.701(1)(d)(2) (emphasis added); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. 
CO. ACT § 701(a)(4)(B) (2006) (emphasis added); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summariz-
ing the data and providing the statutory language).  The language of these twenty-three 
statutes may differ slightly, but not in a material way.   
The Texas statute allows for dissolution if “it is not reasonably practicable to carry on 
the entity’s business in conformity with its governing documents.”  TEX. BUS. ORGS. 
CODE ANN. § 11.314.  The statute defines “governing documents” as the certificate of 
formation and “the other documents or agreements adopted by the entity under this code 
to govern the formation or the internal affairs of the entity.”  Id. § 1.002(36) (emphasis 
added).  If the LLC itself is not a signatory to the operating agreement, one might argue 
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court decides that “[i]t is not reasonably practicable to carry on the busi-
ness in conformity with the certificate of formation or the operating 
agreement.”11  An additional twelve statutes allow a court to dissolve up-
on a finding that “it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the limited 
liability company’s activities and affairs in conformity with the limited 
                                                                                                                             
that the agreement is not a “governing document” because it was not adopted by the 
entity.  Texas recently amended its statute, however, to provide that “[a] company 
agreement is enforceable by or against the limited liability company, regardless of 
whether the company has signed or otherwise expressly adopted the agreement.”  Id. 
§ 101.052(f).  Because the LLC is bound by the operating agreement, the agreement will 
presumably be considered a “governing document” under Texas law (although the fact 
that the LLC did not “adopt” the agreement still leaves some room for argument).  For 
purposes of Appendix 2, Texas was counted as one of the twenty-three statutes with a 
certificate of organization and operating agreement construction. See infra Appendix 2. 
11 See, e.g., MISS. CODE § 79-29-803(1)(a) (emphasis added); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-40 
(emphasis added); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing the 
statutory language).  The language of these sixteen statutes may differ slightly, but not 
in a material way. 
Tennessee has two judicial dissolution statutes. Section 48-245-902 is applicable to eve-
ry domestic LLC formed before January 1, 2006 that has not elected to be governed by 
chapter 249 of the Tennessee Code.  See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-245-902, 48-249-
1002(c).  It provides for dissolution “whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry 
on the business in conformity with the articles and/or the operating agreement.”  Id. 
§ 48-245-902.  For purposes of Appendix 2, this language was considered to be a certif-
icate of organization or operating agreement construction.  See infra Appendix 2. 
Section 48-249-617 is applicable to every domestic LLC formed on or after January 1, 
2006, and any domestic LLC formed before that date that has elected to be governed 
by chapter 249.  See id. §§ 48-249-617, 48-249-1002(a)–(b).  It provides for dissolution 
“whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with 
the LLC documents.”  Id. § 48-249-617(a).  Although this language seems like a certifi-
cate of organization and operating agreement construction, the Tennessee statute de-
fines “LLC documents” as “either, or both:  (A) [a]n LLC’s articles; and (B) [i]f the LLC 
has an operating agreement . . . its operating agreement.”  Id. § 48-249-102(16) (empha-
sis added).  Thus, for purposes of Appendix 2, it too was considered to be a certificate 
of organization or operating agreement construction. See infra Appendix 2. Although 
Tennessee could have been counted twice in my sample in light of its two existing judi-
cial dissolution statutes, it was counted only once in Appendix 2 as one of sixteen stat-
utes (rather than two of seventeen statutes) with a certificate of organization or operat-
ing agreement construction. See infra Appendix 2.  
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liability company agreement.”12  Three more states allow for dissolution 
when a court concludes that “it is not reasonably practicable to carry on 
the company’s activities and affairs.”13  Finally, one state provides for 
dissolution when a court concludes that “it is not practicable to conduct 
the LLC’s business in conformance with the operating agreement and 
this Chapter.”14 
The next most common judicial dissolution ground in the sample 
is the presence of unlawful, illegal, or fraudulent conduct by members, 
managers, or the LLC itself.  Twenty-nine statutes include some version 
of this language.15  The most prevalent formulation is to provide one 
ground that focuses on the company’s activities (“the conduct of all or 
substantially all of the company’s activities is unlawful”)16 and another 
                                                     
12 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10A-5A-7.01(d); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-785(A)(1); see also 
infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing the statutory language).  The 
language of these twelve statutes may differ slightly, but not in a material way. 
The Wisconsin statute allows for dissolution when the LLC “is not acting in conformity 
with an operating agreement,” and it additionally provides for dissolution when “it is 
not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of the limited liability company.”  
WIS. STAT. § 183.0902(1), (2).  As a result, it is counted twice in the data—once as one 
of the twelve statutes with a “not reasonably practicable to carry on the limited liability 
company’s activities and affairs in conformity with the limited liability company agree-
ment” construction, and once as one of the three statutes with a “not reasonably practi-
cable to carry on the company’s activities and affairs” construction.  See infra note 13 
and accompanying text.   
13 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 34-267(a)(4)(B); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-
C:134(I)(a); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing the statuto-
ry language).  The language of these three statutes may differ slightly, but not in a mate-
rial way.  It should be noted that the Wisconsin statute is double-counted in the data.  
See supra note 12.  
14 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-6-02(2)(i); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data 
and providing the statutory language).  An astute reader may notice that the listed cate-
gories add up to fifty-five statutes (23+16+12+3+1) rather than the fifty-four number 
stated in the text.  See supra text accompanying note 9.  The discrepancy is due to the 
fact that Wisconsin is double-counted in the data.  See supra note 12. 
15 See infra Appendix 1, 2. 
16 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 4101(a)(4)(A); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT 
§ 701(a)(4)(A) (2006); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing 
the statutory language). 
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ground that focuses on the behavior of the managers or members (“the 
managers . . . or those members in control of the company . . . have act-
ed, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal or fraudulent”).17  
Some statutes, however, limit the focus exclusively to the conduct of the 
managers or members in control.18 
Dissolution on the grounds of oppressive conduct by managers 
or members is included in twenty-four statutes in the sample.19  Most 
statutes articulate this ground by using the term “oppressive” or “unfairly 
prejudicial” action by the managers or members in control of the com-
pany.20  A very small number of statutes speak of conduct that is an 
“abuse of authority,”21 and a few refer to dissolution when necessary to 
protect the “rights and interests” of the petitioning member.22  I included 
all of these variations in this category.   
Ten statutes provide for judicial dissolution when the economic 
purpose of the company cannot be accomplished.23  Most statutes articu-
late this ground by providing that “the economic purpose of the [LLC] is 
                                                     
17 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32.1-50(1)(e)(1); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT 
§ 701(a)(5)(A) (2006); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing 
the statutory language). 
18 See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 801(4)(v) (1996); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 
(summarizing the data and providing the statutory language).  If the company’s activi-
ties are unlawful, those in control of the company are presumably acting in a manner 
that is illegal.  The absence of an independent ground that focuses on the company’s 
activities, therefore, may not make much of a difference.  
19 See infra Appendix 1, 2. 
20 See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 801(4)(v) (1996); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. 
ACT § 701(a)(5)(B) (2006); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and provid-
ing the statutory language). 
21 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 17707.03(b)(5); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing 
the data and providing the statutory language). 
22 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-6-02(2)(ii); see also CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 17707.03(b)(2) (“rights or interests”); infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and 
providing the statutory language).   
23 See infra Appendix 1, 2. 
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likely to be unreasonably frustrated.”24  One statute provides for dissolu-
tion when a court determines “that it is impossible for the company to 
carry on the purposes of the company,”25 while another is triggered 
when the “business of the limited liability company has been aban-
doned.”26  I included all of these variations in this category. 
Other grounds for judicial dissolution include the following:  (1) 
member conduct that makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the 
company’s business with that member (seven statutes);27 (2) failure to 
purchase the petitioner’s distributional interest when required (five stat-
utes);28 (3) member or manager deadlock (five statutes);29 (4) waste or 
misapplication of assets (four statutes);30 (5) abuse of power by the LLC 
                                                     
24 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.47(B)(1); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT 
§ 801(4)(i) (1996); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing the 
statutory language). 
25 ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.405; see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and 
providing the statutory language). 
26 CAL. CORP. CODE § 17707.03(b)(3); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data 
and providing the statutory language). 
27 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 428-801(4)(B); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 801(4)(ii) 
(1996); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing the statutory 
language). 
28 Upon a dissociation that does not result in dissolution, ULLCA § 701(a) requires the 
company to purchase the distributional interest of the dissociated member.  Failure to 
effectuate the purchase can result in dissolution.  See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT 
§ 801(4)(iv) (1996).  This dissolution ground is also present in the statutes that follow 
ULLCA.  See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 31B-8-801(b)(5)(iv); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 
(summarizing the data and providing the statutory language). 
29 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-785(A)(2); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76,117(b); see 
also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing the statutory language). 
30 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 605.0702(1)(b)(4); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-803(1)(b); see also 
infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing the statutory language). 
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contrary to the public policy of the state (one statute);31 and (6) “other 
circumstances [that] render dissolution equitable” (one statute).32 
II. ANALYSIS OF SELECTED GROUNDS 
A.  In Conformity With . . . ? 
As mentioned, the most common judicial dissolution ground is 
when a court decides that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the 
business in conformity with the LLC’s governing documents.33  In prac-
                                                     
31 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:134(III)(d); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summariz-
ing the data and providing the statutory language). 
32 See WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.274(2); see also infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the 
data and providing the statutory language).  This broad “circumstances [that] render 
dissolution equitable” ground is unique to Washington.  The 1914 Uniform Partnership 
Act included the same ground in its judicial dissolution section, see UNIF. P’SHIP ACT 
§ 32(1)(f) (1914), which may be the origin of the Washington provision.  In fact, the 
ground was formerly a part of the Washington general partnership statute.  See WASH. 
REV. CODE § 25.04.320(1)(f) (1998). 
Reasonable minds could disagree with some of the categorization choices made in this 
article.  For example, a statute providing for dissolution when it is not reasonably prac-
ticable to carry on the business in conformity with the governing documents is similar 
to a statute allowing for dissolution when the economic purpose of the company can-
not be accomplished.  See supra notes 9–14, 23–26 and accompanying text.  Indeed, 
judicial decisions grappling with the “not reasonably practicable” language have granted 
dissolution when the purpose of the company has been frustrated.  See infra note 37 and 
accompanying text.  Thus, perhaps these two categories should be combined.  As an-
other example, a statute providing for dissolution when member conduct makes it not 
reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s business with that member, or a stat-
ute authorizing dissolution under equitable circumstances, may very well cover the same 
ground as a statute allowing for dissolution when a member in control has acted op-
pressively.  See supra notes 19–22, 27, 32 and accompanying text; infra notes 89–91 and 
accompanying text.  Perhaps they too should not be thought of as separate categories. 
33 See supra text accompanying note 9.  From a Uniform Act standpoint, this language 
appears to have originated in the 1976 Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, as 
§ 802 of that act allowed for judicial dissolution “whenever it is not reasonably practi-
cable to carry on the business in conformity with the partnership agreement.” (Notice 
that the certificate of limited partnership is not mentioned.)  The first time that two 
documents were mentioned—the public filing and the private agreement of the own-
ers—appears to have been in the 1996 ULLCA (§ 801(4)(iii)).  That two-document 
structure was then followed by the 2006 RULLCA (§ 701(a)(4)(B)) and the 2013 
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tice, what circumstances might trigger this ground?  In Fisk Ventures, 
LLC v. Segal,34 the Delaware Court of Chancery provided the following 
guidance: 
Section 18-802 has the “obvious purpose of 
providing an avenue of relief when an LLC 
cannot continue to function in accordance 
with its chartering agreement.”      
In interpreting § 18-802, this Court has by 
analogy often looked to the dissolution stat-
ute for limited partnerships, 6 Del. C. § 17-
802.  In so doing, the Court has found that 
“the test of § 17-802 is whether it is ‘reasona-
bly practicable’ to carry on the business of a 
limited partnership, and not whether it is im-
possible.”  To decide whether to dissolve a 
partnership pursuant to § 17-802, the courts 
have historically looked to the “business of 
the partnership and the general partner’s abil-
ity to achieve that purpose in conformity with 
the partnership agreement.” … 
The text of § 18-802 does not specify what a 
court must consider in evaluating the “rea-
sonably practicable” standard, but several 
convincing factual circumstances have per-
vaded the case law: (1) the members’ vote is 
deadlocked at the Board level; (2) the operat-
ing agreement gives no means of navigating 
around the deadlock; and (3) due to the fi-
                                                                                                                             
RULLCA (§ 701(a)(4)(B)).  Interestingly, although the 2001 Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act followed prior uniform limited partnership acts by only mentioning conformi-
ty with the partnership agreement (§ 802), the 2013 Uniform Limited Partnership Act 
adopted a two-document structure by requiring conformity “with the certificate of lim-
ited partnership and partnership agreement” (§ 801(a)(6)(B)). 
34 Civ. A. No. 3017-CC, 2009 WL 73957 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2009). 
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nancial condition of the company, there is ef-
fectively no business to operate. 
These factual circumstances are not individu-
ally dispositive; nor must they all exist for a 
court to find it no longer reasonably practica-
ble for a business to continue operating.  In 
fact, the Court in Haley v. Talcott found that 
although the limited liability company was 
“technically functioning” and “financially sta-
ble,” meaning that it received rent checks and 
paid a mortgage, it should be dissolved be-
cause the company’s activity was “purely a re-
sidual, inertial status quo that just happens to 
exclusively benefit one of the 50% mem-
bers.”  If a board deadlock prevents the lim-
ited liability company from operating or from 
furthering its stated business purpose, it is 
not reasonably practicable for the company 
to carry on its business.35 
On the facts before it, the Fisk Ventures court concluded that 
“[w]hen … a company has no office, no employees, no operating reve-
nue, no prospects of equity or debt infusion, and when the company’s 
Board has a long history of deadlock as a result of its governance struc-
ture, more than ample reason and sufficient evidence exists to order dis-
solution.”36  Other decisions grappling with the “not reasonably practi-
cable” language have granted dissolution when the purpose of the com-
pany has been frustrated.37 
                                                     
35 Id. at *3–4 (internal citations omitted). 
36 Id. at *1. 
37 See, e.g., In re Silver Leaf, L.L.C., No. Civ. A. 20611, 2005 WL 2045641, at *10–11 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2005) (granting dissolution under DLLCA § 18–802: “Silver Leaf 
was formed for the specific purpose of marketing the vending machines of Tasty Fries . 
. . . Thus, at the time the dispute between the parties began, the only asset of Silver Leaf 
was the SMA [a sales and marketing agreement giving Silver Leaf the right to market 
the vending machines] . . . . Now, the SMA is no longer an asset of Silver Leaf because 
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Tasty Fries terminated that contract . . . . Clearly, the business of marketing Tasty 
Fries’s machines no longer exists for Silver Leaf . . . . The vote of the members is dead-
locked and the Operating Agreement provides no means around the deadlock. Moreo-
ver, Silver Leaf has no business to operate. Therefore, upon application of a member . . 
. the court dissolves Silver Leaf.”); In re Arrow Inv. Advisors, LLC, C.A. No. 4091-VCS, 
2009 WL 1101682, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 23, 2009) (“[D]issolution is reserved for situa-
tions in which the LLC’s management has become so dysfunctional or its business pur-
pose so thwarted that it is no longer practicable to operate the business, such as in the 
case of a voting deadlock or where the defined purpose of the entity has become im-
possible to fulfill.”); id. at *3 (“Dissolution of an entity chartered for a broad business 
purpose remains possible upon a strong showing that a confluence of situationally spe-
cific adverse financial, market, product, managerial, or corporate governance circum-
stances make it nihilistic for the entity to continue.  In other words, a petitioner might 
obtain dissolution by making a convincing showing that the perpetuation of the entity, 
irrespective of its managers’ intentions to pursue a business line allowed by its govern-
ing instrument, was obviously futile and would not result in business success.”); id. 
(“One need not speculate on exactly what circumstances of that type might suffice to 
make that showing in order to confidently conclude that Hamman cannot state a claim 
for dissolution by simply alleging that a two-year-old LLC with a broad purpose clause 
has experienced some adversity and therefore ought to be dissolved. By that standard, 
investors could state a claim for dissolution against virtually all entities on a regular ba-
sis, especially in years of economic turbulence like this one.”); In re 1545 Ocean Ave., 
LLC, 893 N.Y.S.2d 590, 597–98 (App. Div. 2010) (“After careful examination of the 
various factors considered in applying the ‘not reasonably practicable’ standard, we hold 
that for dissolution of a limited liability company . . . the petitioning member must es-
tablish, in the context of the terms of the operating agreement or articles of incorpora-
tion, that (1) the management of the entity is unable or unwilling to reasonably permit 
or promote the stated purpose of the entity to be realized or achieved, or (2) continuing 
the entity is financially unfeasible.”); McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enters., 725 N.E.2d 
1193, 1220, 1222 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (“[T]he evidence does support the trial court’s 
conclusion that it was no longer practicable to carry on the business of CHL [an LLC 
formed for the purpose of obtaining a National Hockey League franchise in Columbus, 
Ohio] . . . .  The above evidence shows that the cause of it being no longer practicable 
to carry on the business of CHL was the fact that CHL was not the ownership group 
awarded the NHL franchise . . . .  June 9, 1997 was the deadline for the ownership 
group to be identified.  This ownership group was not CHL.  Hence, as of June 9, 1997, 
the reason for CHL’s existence was gone.”); cf. Dunbar Group, LLC v. Tignor, 593 
S.E.2d 216, 219 (Va. 2004) (concluding that serious disagreement between the members 
does not necessarily meet the dissolution standard, as even with discord, it may still be 
reasonably practicable to carry on the business:  “Although Tignor’s actions [as a mem-
ber and manager of Xpert, the LLC] had created numerous problems in the operation 
of Xpert, his expulsion as a member changed his role from one of an active participant 
in the management of Xpert to the more passive role of an investor in the company.  
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While case law has provided some guidance on the circumstances 
that might lead to dissolution under this ground, the differences in the 
statutory articulations are puzzling. Why, for example, do twenty-three 
statutes allow for dissolution if it is not reasonably practicable to carry on 
the business in conformity with the certificate and the operating agree-
ment, while another sixteen statutes provide for dissolution only if it is 
not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with 
the certificate or the operating agreement?  Is this a meaningful distinc-
tion?  Given that the members, the managers, and the LLC itself are 
constrained by provisions in both the certificate and the operating 
agreement,38 one would think that the impracticability of carrying on the 
business in conformity with either one of those governing documents 
should be enough for dissolution.   
For example, assume that the certificate of an LLC contains a 
broad purpose clause allowing the LLC to engage in any lawful business.  
The operating agreement, however, states the purpose of the venture in 
much narrower terms—to operate a particular fast-food franchise.  After 
years of mismanagement, the franchisor revokes the franchise.  This 
seems like a good case for dissolution, as the purpose of the company 
                                                                                                                             
The record fails to show that after this change in the daily management of Xpert, it 
would not be reasonably practicable for Xpert to carry on its business pursuant to its 
operating authority.”). 
38 If the LLC itself is not a signatory to the operating agreement, one might argue that 
the LLC is not constrained by the provisions of the agreement.  Compare Bubbles & 
Bleach, LLC v. Becker, No. 97 C 1320, 1997 WL 285938, at *4–6 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 
1997) (holding that an arbitration clause in an LLC operating agreement was not bind-
ing on the LLC because it was not a party to the agreement), with Elf Atochem N. Am., 
Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 293 (Del. 1999) (rejecting the argument that an arbitration 
provision in an LLC agreement was inapplicable to the LLC because it failed to sign the 
agreement).  In some jurisdictions, this issue is now handled by statute.  See, e.g., DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (“A limited liability company is bound by its limited lia-
bility company agreement whether or not the limited liability company executes the 
limited liability company agreement.”); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.052(f) (“A 
company agreement is enforceable by or against the limited liability company, regardless 
of whether the company has signed or otherwise expressly adopted the agreement.”); 
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 106(a) (2006) (amended 2013) (“A limited liability 
company is bound by and may enforce the operating agreement, whether or not the 
company has itself manifested assent to the operating agreement.”). 
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has been frustrated (i.e., the LLC can no longer operate a franchise of 
this particular restaurant).  An “or” statute may very well reach this dis-
solution result, as it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business 
in conformity with the operating agreement (and its more narrow pur-
pose).39  That said, it is still possible to operate the business in conformi-
ty with the certificate, as any other lawful business may be pursued.  Un-
der an “and” statute, therefore, dissolution may be unavailable, as it is 
reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the 
certificate.40  
Of course, this argument assumes that an “and” statute would be 
interpreted to result in dissolution only (A) if it is not reasonably practi-
cable to carry on the business in conformity with the certificate, and (B) if 
it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity 
with the operating agreement.  Under this “double-condition” construc-
tion, both (A) and (B) have to be met to result in dissolution.  Converse-
ly, the practicability of carrying on the business in conformity with either 
the certificate or the operating agreement will prevent dissolution from 
occurring.  There is, however, another reasonable construction.  Perhaps 
an “and” statute should be interpreted to mean that dissolution results 
only if it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in con-
formity with the certificate and the operating agreement as a set.  Under 
this “single-condition” construction, the sole condition for dissolution is 
if it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity 
with both of the governing documents.  Conversely, if it is reasonably 
practicable to carry on the business in conformity with both of the gov-
erning documents, then dissolution is denied.  Under this interpretation, 
our example above would result in dissolution because it is not reasona-
bly practicable to carry on the business in conformity with both of the 
governing documents; instead, it is reasonably practicable to carry on the 
business with only one of the governing documents (the certificate).41 
                                                     
39 This assumes a double-condition construction of an “or” statute.  See infra text ac-
companying note 42. 
40 This assumes a double-condition construction of an “and” statute.  See infra text ac-
companying note 41. 
41 See supra text accompanying notes 39–40. 
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This interpretive issue is present with “or” statutes as well.  
Should the statute receive a double-condition construction—i.e., dissolu-
tion occurs only (A) if it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the 
business in conformity with the certificate, or (B) if it is not reasonably 
practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the operating 
agreement?  Under such a construction, either (A) or (B) has to be met 
to result in dissolution.  Conversely, the practicability of carrying on the 
business in conformity with both the certificate and the operating 
agreement will prevent dissolution from occurring.  Alternatively, per-
haps the statute should receive a single-condition construction where 
dissolution results only if it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the 
business in conformity with the certificate or the operating agreement as 
a set.  The sole condition for dissolution, in other words, is if it is not 
reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the 
certificate or the operating agreement.  Conversely, if it is reasonably 
practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the certificate or 
the operating agreement, then dissolution is denied.  Using our example 
in the text (it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in 
conformity with the operating agreement, but it is reasonably practicable 
to carry on the business in conformity with the certificate), notice that 
the double-condition construction would result in dissolution, while the 
single-condition construction would not.42   
The key point from this discussion is that the impracticability of 
carrying on the business in conformity with either the certificate or the 
operating agreement should result in dissolution, as the members, the 
managers, and the LLC itself are constrained by provisions in both doc-
uments.43  Nevertheless, there is some confusion over which statutory 
articulation is consistent with this result.  Depending on how courts con-
strue the statutes, it may be that both “and” and “or” statutory articula-
tions will reach this preferred outcome.  An “and” statute with a single-
condition construction does, as does an “or” statute with a double-
                                                     
42 See supra text accompanying notes 39–40. 
43 But see supra note 38 (stating that if the LLC itself is not a signatory to the operating 
agreement, one might argue that the LLC is not constrained by the provisions of the 
agreement). 
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condition construction.  Indeed, it may very well be that drafters of both 
“and” and “or” statutes (whether legislatures or uniform organizations) 
were all trying to reach this result, but the “and” drafters were thinking 
of a single-condition construction, while the “or” drafters were thinking 
of a double-condition construction.  Of course, depending on what 
courts do, it is possible that neither statutory articulation will reach the 
preferred outcome (e.g., an “and” statute with a double-condition con-
struction, and an “or” statute with a single-condition construction). 
An additional twelve statutes allow a court to dissolve upon a 
finding that “it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the limited liabil-
ity company’s activities and affairs in conformity with the limited liability 
company agreement.”44  Under this formulation, the operating agreement 
is the only document that matters.  This also seems problematic given 
that the business of the LLC has to be conducted in conformity with the 
provisions of the certificate.45  While it is true that most LLC certificates 
will not include any provisions beyond the minimum statutory require-
ments, there is nothing preventing an LLC from including numerous 
substantive provisions in its certificate, including provisions that would 
typically be found in an operating agreement.46  For example, modifying 
our earlier hypothetical slightly, suppose an LLC’s certificate stated a nar-
row purpose for the business—i.e., to operate a particular fast-food fran-
chise—and suppose further that the franchisor revokes the franchise.  
Once again, this seems like a good case for dissolution, as the purpose of 
the company has been frustrated (i.e., the LLC can no longer operate a 
franchise of this particular restaurant).  Indeed, given that the narrow 
                                                     
44 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
45 Cf. N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 417(a) (“Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the 
members of a limited liability company shall adopt a written operating agreement that 
contains any provisions not inconsistent with law or its articles of organization . . . .” (em-
phasis added)). 
46 See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 201(c) (2006) (amended 2013) (noting 
that “[a] certificate of organization may contain statements as to matters other than 
those required”); see also UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 203(b) (1996) (stating that 
“[a]rticles of organization of a limited liability company may set forth . . . provisions 
permitted to be set forth in an operating agreement . . . or . . . other matters not incon-
sistent with law”). 
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purpose clause was in the certificate, any post-revocation activities of the 
LLC are arguably ultra vires.47  Nevertheless, under a statutory formula-
tion that looks only at a lack of conformity with the provisions of the 
operating agreement, dissolution may be unavailable. 
Of course, a court might find an implied provision in the operat-
ing agreement that the business must be conducted in accordance with 
the certificate.  The inability to operate the franchise, therefore, would 
make it not reasonably practicable to carry on the LLC’s business in con-
formity with the operating agreement (i.e., the operating agreement re-
quires conformity with the certificate, and the narrow purpose provision 
in the certificate cannot be complied with).  Alternatively, given that 
“operating agreement” is usually defined broadly to encompass any 
agreement of the members regarding the LLC,48 perhaps a court would 
characterize the certificate as a form of operating agreement.49  After all, 
to the extent that the members are bound by the provisions of the certif-
                                                     
47 An act outside the scope of an organization’s stated purpose is “ultra vires.”  The 
doctrine is typically associated with corporation law, but it would presumably apply to 
an LLC as well.  See generally DOUGLAS K. MOLL & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, CLOSELY 
HELD CORPORATIONS § 2.08 (LexisNexis 2016) (discussing the ultra vires doctrine). 
48 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (defining “limited liability company 
agreement” as “any agreement (whether referred to as a limited liability company 
agreement, operating agreement or otherwise), written, oral or implied, of the member 
or members as to the affairs of a limited liability company and the conduct of its busi-
ness”). 
49 Cf. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 107 cmt. (2006) (amended 2013) (stating 
that “language in an LLC’s certificate of organization . . . might be evidence of the 
members’ agreement and might thereby constitute or at least imply a term of the oper-
ating agreement”). 
The Delaware statute provides for dissolution when “it is not reasonably practicable to 
carry on the business in conformity with a limited liability company agreement.”  DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802.  In In re Seneca Investments LLC, 970 A.2d 259 (Del. Ch. 
2008), the court stated that “[i]n determining whether it is reasonably practicable to 
carry on the business of the LLC, the Court must look to the purpose clause set forth 
in the governing agreements, in this case, the charter.”  Id. at 263 (emphasis added).  The 
court denied dissolution, at least in part because the LLC’s charter had a broad “any 
lawful act” purpose clause.  See id.  No mention was made of the fact that the Delaware 
statute, on its face, is limited to a consideration of the limited liability company agree-
ment. See id.  
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icate, we might characterize the certificate as a “deemed agreement” of 
the members.  By doing so, the revocation of the franchise would result 
in the inability to carry on the LLC’s business in conformity with an op-
erating agreement.  The need to stretch to make these arguments, how-
ever, demonstrates that a statutory formulation considering only the op-
erating agreement is misguided.  Once again, statutes allowing for disso-
lution when it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in 
conformity with either the certificate or the operating agreement seem 
more sensible.50 
B.  Whither Oppression 
In general, the oppression doctrine protects minority owners 
from the abusive exercise of majority control.51  Common examples of 
oppressive conduct include the termination of a minority owner’s em-
ployment, the removal of a minority owner from a management position, 
the refusal to make distributions, and the denial of access to company 
information.52  The oppression problem originated in the closely held 
corporation setting as a result of four factors that are present in that con-
                                                     
50 The North Carolina statute allows for judicial dissolution when “it is not practicable 
to conduct the LLC’s business in conformance with the operating agreement and this 
Chapter.”  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-6-02(2)(i); see supra note 14 and accompanying text.  
The “Chapter” (the North Carolina Limited Liability Company Act) requires articles of 
organization to be filed, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57D-2-21, and the provisions of the 
articles are presumably binding on the managers, members, and the LLC itself.  Thus, it 
would seem that the North Carolina statute can be analogized to statutes allowing for 
dissolution when it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the LLC’s business in con-
formity with the certificate and the operating agreement.  See supra note 10 and accom-
panying text.     
Three statutes allow for judicial dissolution when it is not reasonably practicable to car-
ry on the company’s activities and affairs.  See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
These statutes have no limiting “in conformity with” language.  This approach seems to 
give flexibility to courts to dissolve in any situation involving frustration of the purpose 
of the business.  
51 See, e.g., Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression and the New Louisiana Business Corpora-
tion Act, 60 LOY. L. REV. 461, 462 (2014);  see generally MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 47, 
ch. 7 (providing an in-depth discussion of the oppression doctrine); id. ch. 8 (providing 
an in-depth discussion of remedies for oppression). 
52 See, e.g., MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 47, § 7.01[A], at 7-5. 
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text—the lack of exit rights, the norm of majority rule, the deference of 
the business judgment rule, and the absence of advance planning.53  
Those same factors are present in the LLC setting as well: 
Although generalizations are dangerous due 
to the wide variety of LLC statutes, the 
“seeds” of oppression are, in many jurisdic-
tions, present in the LLC setting.  The same 
combination of “no exit” and majority 
rule—a combination that has left minority 
shareholders vulnerable in the close corpora-
tion for decades—exists in the LLC.  Fur-
ther, the deference of the business judgment 
rule and the likely absence of contractual 
safeguards will stymie most minority efforts 
to obtain relief.  Given this setting, and 
based on the close corporation experience, it 
is inevitable that some majority owners will 
abuse their control at the expense of minori-
ty investors.  Just as in the close corporation, 
                                                     
53 As I have written elsewhere: 
In the close corporation setting, four primary fac-
tors form the “seeds” of the oppression prob-
lem—the lack of exit rights, the norm of majority 
rule, the deference of the business judgment rule, 
and the absence of advance planning.  Standing 
alone, the existence of any one of these factors in 
a particular business setting might be insufficient 
to warrant a special remedial doctrine.  In combi-
nation, however, the existence of all of these fac-
tors in the same business context creates a great 
potential for abuse of minority investors.  Un-
doubtedly, the presence of these factors in the 
close corporation environment spurred the need 
for judicial oversight and prompted the develop-
ment of the modern-day shareholder oppression 
doctrine. 
Moll, supra note 3, at 916–17. 
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legitimate judicial scrutiny of majority con-
duct is needed.  The oppression doctrine, in 
other words, has a place in the LLC struc-
ture as well.54 
Despite these similarities, judicial dissolution statutes in the cor-
poration setting are far more likely to include oppression-related protec-
tion than similar statutes in the LLC context.  Corporation statutes in 
forty states provide for dissolution or other relief on the grounds of 
“oppressive actions” (or similar term) by “directors or those in con-
trol.”55  In contrast, LLC statutes in only twenty-one states provide simi-
lar oppression-related protection.56  Given that the oppression problem 
can arise in both forms of business organization, what might explain this 
difference?  Some thoughts are presented below. 
1.  Exit Rights57 
Exit rights for the owners of any business organization are useful 
in two major respects.  First, an exit allows an owner to liquidate his in-
vestment and to recover the value of his invested capital.58  Second, the 
threat of exit in large numbers tends to restrain managers from taking ac-
tion that harms the interests of owners.59  Significantly, without exit 
                                                     
54 Id. at 956–57. 
55 See MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 47, § 7.01[D][1][b][i], at 7-72 n.192. 
56 Along with the twenty-one states, three uniform acts (ULLCA, RULLCA, and 
RULLCA (2013)) provide oppression-related protection in the LLC setting.  See supra 
notes 19–22 and accompanying text (noting that twenty-four statutes in the sample 
provide for dissolution on the grounds of oppressive conduct by managers or mem-
bers). 
57 Portions of this sub-section are taken from Moll, supra note 3, at 896–97. 
58 See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass. 1975) (ob-
serving that a market exit allows a shareholder to “sell his stock in order to extricate 
some of his invested capital”). 
59 Many commentators have argued that the existence of a market helps to combat the 
abusive exercise of control.  Professors Hetherington & Dooley, for example, state the 
following: 
Market restraints are most visible and workable in 
the case of publicly held corporations. If manage-
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rights, an owner’s invested capital is indefinitely “locked-into” the entity 
                                                                                                                             
ment is inefficient, indulges its own preferences, 
or otherwise acts contrary to shareholder interests, 
dissatisfied shareholders will sell their shares and 
move to more attractive investment opportunities. 
As more shareholders express their dissatisfaction 
by selling, the market price of the company’s 
shares will decline to the point where existing 
management is exposed to the risk of being dis-
placed through a corporate takeover . . . .  The 
mere threat of displacement, whether or not real-
ized, is a powerful incentive for managers of pub-
licly held corporations to promote their share-
holders’ interests so as to keep the price of the 
company’s shares as high and their own positions 
as secure as possible. 
J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory 
Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 39–40 (1977) (foot-
note omitted). Similarly, as Professor Bahls observes: 
A public market creates significant and powerful 
incentives for managers to manage corporations in 
a way that maximizes profits and owners’ returns. 
A public market for stock allows dissatisfied 
shareholders to sell their shares. Sales of a signifi-
cant number of shares depress stock prices, mak-
ing way for new owners (sometimes corporate 
raiders) to buy stock and oust incompetent in-
cumbent management. Similarly, the management 
of publicly held corporations is more carefully 
monitored by persons outside the corporation, in-
cluding independent directors, accountants, and 
investment bankers. As a result, the market creates 
incentives for managers to align their interests 
with the interests of shareholders. 
Steven C. Bahls, Application of Corporate Common Law Doctrines to Limited Liability Compa-
nies, 55 MONT. L. REV. 43, 76–77 (1994) (footnote omitted); see also Rosenfield v. Metals 
Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1262 n.18 (Conn. 1994) (“The market for corporate con-
trol serves to constrain managers’ conduct that does not maximize shareholder wealth. 
It therefore serves to align the interests of managers more closely with the interests of 
shareholders in publicly traded corporations. The market for corporate control does not 
affect, however, the incentives of managers of closely held corporations.”). 
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and, in general, the capital can be used as the controlling owner sees fit.60  
When exit rights are absent, therefore, oppressive conduct can result in 
the “effective confiscation” of the minority’s investment.61  Not surpris-
ingly, a number of commentators have asserted that the lack of exit rights 
is the primary cause of the oppression problem and is the factor driving 
the need for judicial oversight.62 
In the closely held corporation, the lack of exit rights is a reality.  
For all practical purposes, minority shareholders in closely held corpora-
tions are unable to sell, unable to demand a buyout, and unable to cause a 
                                                     
60 See, e.g., Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders 
and its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 447 (1990) 
(“[T]he primary vulnerability of a minority shareholder is the spectre of being ‘locked-
in,’ that is, having a perpetual investment in an entity without any expectation of ever 
receiving a return on that investment.”); infra note 61 (observing that oppressive con-
duct allows the majority to use the minority’s investment for the majority’s own pur-
poses). 
61 Edwin J. Bradley, An Analysis of the Model Close Corporation Act and a Proposed Legislative 
Strategy, 10 J. CORP. L. 817, 840 (1985) (“Never should the minority participant [in an 
oppression context] be understood as assenting to the effective confiscation of his or 
her investment. . . .”); see, e.g., Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: 
The Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 817 n.267 (2000) (“In this 
[oppression] context, the majority shareholder should be viewed as simply appropriat-
ing a portion of the minority’s investment to further the majority’s own interests.”); F. 
Hodge O’Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 BUS. 
LAW. 873, 887 (1978) (“Not to provide a remedy in [oppressive] circumstances of this 
kind is to permit the majority shareholders to exploit the minority shareholder’s in-
vestment solely for their own benefit.”). 
62 See, e.g., Laurel Wheeling Farrar & Susan Pace Hamill, Dissociation from Alabama Limited 
Liability Companies in the Post Check-the-Box Era, 49 ALA. L. REV. 909, 924 n.64 (1998) 
(noting that “the most significant problem faced by the shareholders [of a close corpo-
ration]” is “that of no liquidity of shares”); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith? 
The Foibles of Fairness in the Law of Close Corporations, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1143, 
1149 (1990) (“More than any other characteristic, this ‘no exit’ phenomenon has 
pushed the law into developing special rules for shareholders in close corporations.”); 
Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders’ Reasonable Expectations, 66 
WASH. U. L. Q. 193, 225 (1988) (“Once a corporation’s shares are publicly traded, mi-
nority shareholders, even if they are also employees, are not subjected to the risks that 
are common to the close corporation and which inspired the modern legislative and 
judicial remedies.”). 
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dissolution of the company.63  In the LLC, however, some statutes still 
provide members with the right to exit the venture and to “cash out” of 
the company.  These statutes are modeled after ULLCA and generally 
provide for a fair value buyout upon a member’s dissociation that does 
not result in dissolution of the company.64  Member dissociation, in other 
words, will provide liquidity either through a buyout or dissolution.  
When exit rights are present, there is little need for explicit oppression-
related protection, as minority owners can protect themselves from abu-
sive majority conduct by simply dissociating and cashing out.65  Thus, ju-
risdictions providing such exit rights may simply have believed that op-
pression-related dissolution provisions were unnecessary. 
Unfortunately, this explanation has a critical weakness—it simply 
does not fit the data.  Only four state statutes provide exit rights,66 and all 
four additionally provide an oppression-related dissolution ground.67  Put 
differently, not a single jurisdiction stands for the proposition that state 
statutes offer exit rights in lieu of oppression provisions.  As a result, an 
argument that exit rights explain the smaller number of LLC statutes with 
                                                     
63 See Moll, supra note 3, at 897–905. 
64 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 428-701(a); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-808(1); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 33-44-701; W. VA. CODE § 31B-8-701(a); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 701(a) 
(1996). 
In an at-will LLC, the buyout is at fair value determined as of the date of dissociation.  
See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 701(a)(1) (1996).  In a term LLC, the buyout is at 
fair value determined as of the date of the expiration of the specified term.  See id. 
§ 701(a)(2).  A buyout in a term LLC, therefore, may take substantially longer to com-
plete.  If the LLC fails to make the required purchase of the membership interest, a court 
can judicially dissolve the company.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
65 See supra note 62 and accompanying text (noting that a number of commentators have 
asserted that the lack of exit rights is the primary cause of the oppression problem and is 
the factor driving the need for judicial oversight). 
66 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
67 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 428-801(4)(E); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-902(1)(e); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 33-44-801(4)(e); W. VA. CODE § 31B-8-801(b)(5)(v); see also UNIF. LTD. 
LIAB. CO. ACT § 701(a) (1996) (providing for dissolution on oppression-related 
grounds); infra Appendix 1, 2 (summarizing the data and providing the statutory lan-
guage). 
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oppression-related dissolution provisions seems more theoretical than 
real. 
Perhaps the argument can be resuscitated, at least in part, with a 
historical view of exit rights in the LLC.  Consider the following observa-
tions: 
When the first LLC statutes were passed, 
most included provisions that provided li-
quidity to members if they chose to exit the 
business.  These provisions took two forms.  
First, the majority of LLC statutes provided 
that members had the power to withdraw 
from the business in the absence of a con-
trary provision in the operating agreement.  
Upon withdrawal, the member was entitled 
to be paid the fair value of its ownership in-
terest less any damages caused by a wrongful 
withdrawal.  Second, most of the LLC stat-
utes provided for dissolution of the LLC 
upon the member’s withdrawal or other dis-
sociation from the venture (e.g., dissociation 
due to a member’s death, bankruptcy, or in-
competency).  An actual liquidation of the 
business could be avoided, however, if all 
(or a majority under some statutes) of the 
remaining members elected to continue the 
venture.  Even if liquidation were averted, 
the withdrawing member was still entitled to 
a buyout of its ownership interest. 
The inclusion of these provisions in the 
statutory scheme of the LLC was no acci-
dent.  Before 1997, the IRS applied the 
“corporate resemblance” test to determine 
whether an LLC would be classified as a 
partnership or a corporation for tax purpos-
es.  Under that test, an LLC was “taxed like 
a partnership unless it possesse[d] three or 
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more of the four corporate characteristics, 
including continuity of life, centralized man-
agement, limited liability, and free transfera-
bility of interests.”  Because LLCs possess 
limited liability, a state’s statutory scheme 
needed to deny two of the remaining corpo-
rate characteristics to insure partnership tax 
status.  Many statutes provided for manager-
managed LLCs if the members desired, rais-
ing at least the possibility that centralized 
management would be found.  Thus, the 
LLC statutes needed to deny the free trans-
ferability of interests and continuity of life 
characteristics possessed by the traditional 
corporation. 
. . . .  [T]he provisions calling for the LLC’s 
dissolution upon the member’s withdrawal 
or other dissociation from the business were 
designed to resist a continuity of life finding.  
Treasury Regulations at the time provided 
that “[i]f the death, insanity, bankruptcy, re-
tirement, resignation, or expulsion of any 
member will cause a dissolution of the or-
ganization, continuity of life does not exist.”  
As a result, most LLC statutory schemes in-
cluded a dissolution provision with triggers 
that closely tracked the language of the 
Treasury Regulations. 
In the first wave of LLC statutes, therefore, 
the inclusion of withdrawal and dissolution 
provisions provided exit rights and accom-
panying liquidity to LLC investors.  The 
withdrawal provisions obviously provided 
liquidity by typically stating that a member 
would receive the fair value of its ownership 
interest upon withdrawal.  The dissolution 
provisions provided liquidity by requiring 
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the company to be sold (in the event of liq-
uidation) and by allocating to each member 
its proportionate share of the company’s sale 
value.  If liquidation were avoided, the mi-
nority member was still entitled to its buyout 
upon withdrawal.68 
As this passage reveals, exit rights were prevalent when the first 
wave of LLC statutes were passed, and little attention may have been 
paid to explicit oppression-related dissolution provisions as a result.  As 
mentioned, when exit rights are present, minority owners can protect 
themselves from oppressive majority conduct; there is little need for a 
judicial remedy.69  In late 1996, however, the IRS scrapped the corporate 
resemblance test in favor of the more easily administered “check the 
box” regulations.  Under the new regulations, an LLC automatically re-
ceives pass-through partnership income tax treatment unless it affirma-
tively elects otherwise.70  Following the passage of the regulations, there 
was no longer a tax-driven need to deny certain “corporate” characteris-
tics to LLCs.  In response, and spurred further by estate and gift tax con-
cerns, many states restricted or eliminated the exit rights that had served 
to combat a continuity of life finding.71 
Given this historical background, one might argue that legisla-
tures, preoccupied with federal income tax changes affecting the LLC 
and related estate and gift tax concerns, simply overlooked the connec-
tion between exit rights and protection from oppressive conduct.  After 
all, the statutory presence of exit rights largely eliminated any prior legis-
lative need to focus on the oppression problem.  Under this thinking, 
attention to the issue might be all that is needed to prompt states to add 
oppression-related dissolution provisions.  That attention might come in 
                                                     
68 Moll, supra note 3, at 926–31 (footnotes omitted). 
69 See supra note 62 and accompanying text (noting that a number of commentators have 
asserted that the lack of exit rights is the primary cause of the oppression problem and is 
the factor driving the need for judicial oversight). 
70 See Moll, supra note 3, at 931–32 & n.167. 
71 See id. at 932–40. 
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the form of RULLCA and RULLCA (2013), which both include such 
protection.72  As states continue to reconsider their LLC statutes in light 
of these modern uniform acts, the need for an oppression provision to 
offset the absence of exit rights may become apparent.  Some support 
for this argument can be drawn from the fact that the number of states 
with oppression-related dissolution provisions appears to have increased 
from eight to twenty-one over the past sixteen years.73 
In short, the initial prevalence of exit rights in the LLC setting 
may explain why legislatures were not focused on the oppression issue 
when LLC statutes were first enacted.  Now that exit rights have largely 
been eliminated, it may simply be a matter of time before states realize 
that their past elimination of exit rights contributes to the present vul-
nerability of minority members.  Under this thinking, one would expect 
that the number of oppression-related judicial dissolution provisions will 
continue to increase with the passage of time. 
                                                     
72 See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 701(a)(5)(B) (2006); REVISED UNIF. LTD. 
LIAB. CO. ACT § 701(a)(4)(C)(ii) (2006) (amended 2013).  Interestingly, neither the 1992 
Prototype LLC Act nor the 2011 Revised Prototype LLC Act includes an oppression-
related judicial dissolution provision.  Both acts were drafted by a committee of the 
American Bar Association, and both provide only one judicial dissolution ground—
when it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of the LLC in conformity 
with the operating agreement.  See infra Appendix 1 (providing the statutory language). 
73 Compare Sandra K. Miller, What Buy-Out Rights, Fiduciary Duties, and Dissolution Remedies 
Should Apply in the Case of the Minority Owner of a Limited Liability Company?, 38 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 413, 460–61 & n.245–46 (2001) (stating that “a growing number of states 
provide the remedy of a judicial dissolution upon a showing of certain majority mis-
conduct,” and citing the LLC statutes of Alaska, California, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, 
Maine, Minnesota, and Ohio), with supra note 56 and accompanying text (noting that 
LLC statutes in twenty-one states provide oppression-related protection). 
On the other hand, some states adopting RULLCA or RULLCA (2013) have explicitly 
removed the oppression-related dissolution ground that is present in the Uniform Acts.  
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 605.0702; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34A-801 (stating neverthe-
less, in the “historical and statutory notes,” that “[t]his section is similar to § 801 of the 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996) and § 701 of the Revised Uniform Lim-
ited Liability Company Act (2006)”).  South Dakota does have an oppression-related 
dissolution provision in its corporation statute.  See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-1A-
1430(2)(b).  Florida does not.  See FLA. STAT. § 607.1430. 
108          TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW           [Vol. 19 
2.  Fiduciary Duty 
In the closely held corporation setting, traditional principles of 
fiduciary duty may not protect minority owners from oppressive majority 
conduct.  At least part of the reason for this lack of protection is due to 
the conventional notion that fiduciary duties run to the corporation (or 
to the shareholders collectively), but do not run to individual sharehold-
ers.74  Consequently, a minority shareholder can have difficulty challeng-
ing, for example, a termination of employment or a removal from man-
agement on traditional fiduciary duty grounds, as a court usually requires 
that harm to the corporation—rather than harm merely to the minority 
shareholder—be shown.75  Dissolution for oppression statutes are need-
ed in the closely held corporation setting, therefore, because they focus 
                                                     
74 See, e.g., Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 721 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(observing that “directors’ duties of loyalty and care run to the corporation, not to indi-
vidual shareholders or even to a majority of the shareholders”); Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 
S.W.3d 856, 885 n.53 (Tex. 2014) (“But a corporate officer or director’s duty is to the 
corporation and its shareholders collectively, not any individual shareholder or sub-
group of shareholders, even if that subgroup represents a majority of the ownership.”); 
Hoggett v. Brown, 971 S.W.2d 472, 488 n.13 (Tex. App. 1997) (stating that “a majority 
shareholder’s fiduciary duty ordinarily runs to the corporation”); McLaughlin v. 
Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 153 (Utah 2009) (“These corporate duties have been interpreted 
to coincide with the common law understanding that officers and directors owe these 
duties to the corporation and shareholders collectively, not individually.” (citation omit-
ted)); Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126, 1136 (Wyo. 1985) (“The duty of the directors . 
. . is a duty to the corporation and not a duty to the stockholder instituting the action.”); 
Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 59, at 12 & n.30 (mentioning the traditional view 
that duties run “solely between the majority and the corporation,” and observing that 
the “notion that the fiduciary obligations of management run only to the corporation 
provides the minority in close corporations virtually no protection against oppression 
and exploitation by the control group”). 
75 See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 59, at 12 (“[C]ourts undoubtedly . . . have 
been influenced by traditional common law attitudes emphasizing . . . proof of harm to 
the corporation as distinguished from the interests of individual shareholders.”); cf. Do-
nahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513 & n.14 (Mass. 1975) (noting, 
while discussing traditional fiduciary duty principles, that “in practice, the plaintiff will 
find difficulty in challenging dividend or employment policies,” and observing that it 
“would be difficult for the plaintiff in the instant case to establish breach of a fiduciary 
duty owed to the corporation, as indicated by the finding of the trial judge”). 
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on harm to an individual minority owner in a way that traditional fiduci-
ary duty principles do not.76 
In the LLC setting, many statutes explicitly impose a fiduciary 
duty on managers (in manager-managed LLCs) and members (in mem-
ber-managed LLCs) that is owed to an individual minority member.77  
That duty allows a minority member to bring a breach of fiduciary duty 
action in response to managerial conduct that is harmful to the member 
(rather than to the company).78  Perhaps legislatures believed that a judi-
cial dissolution provision was less necessary in the LLC context because 
oppressive conduct could instead be remedied through an individual 
breach of fiduciary duty action.79 
Although this argument seems plausible, it should be noted that 
under some statutory articulations, the fiduciary duty language may be 
less useful for combatting oppression.  Even though the statute explicitly 
provides that a fiduciary duty is owed to a member, the scope of the duty 
may be limited to company-related harms.80  In addition, with oppres-
                                                     
76 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30 cmt. 2 (noting that “‘oppressive’ behavior in 
[the judicial dissolution statute] generally describes action directed against a particular 
shareholder”). 
77 See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/15-3; FLA. STAT. § 605.04091; UNIF. LTD. LIAB. 
CO. ACT § 409 (1996); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 (2006); REVISED 
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 (2006) (amended 2013).  
78 But see infra note 80 and accompanying text (noting that under some statutory articula-
tions, the scope of the fiduciary duty may be limited to company-related harms). 
79 That said, both RULLCA and RULLCA (2013) (and the states that follow them) im-
pose a fiduciary duty owed to a member that is not limited to company-related harms, 
and they additionally provide an oppression-related dissolution provision.  See, e.g., 
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §§ 409 & cmt., 701(a)(5)(B) (2006); REVISED UNIF. 
LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §§ 409 & cmt., 701(a)(4)(C)(ii) (2006) (amended 2013); see also infra 
note 80 and accompanying text (noting that under some statutory articulations, the 
scope of the fiduciary duty may be limited to company-related harms). 
80 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 17704.09(b) (stating that the duty of loyalty is “limited 
to” listed company-related obligations); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(b) (1996) 
(same).  Consider the following observations from a comment to the analogous provi-
sion of the 2013 Revised Uniform Partnership Act: 
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sion-based dissolution provisions, buyouts and other useful alternative 
remedies are well-established.81  Whether such remedies are available in a 
breach of fiduciary duty action is more of an open question.82  Finally, 
while a substantial amount of precedent makes clear that an owner’s par-
ticipatory rights (e.g., employment and management rights) can be pro-
tected under the oppression doctrine,83 it is less clear whether such rights 
would be viewed as within the scope of a conventional fiduciary duty 
action.84 
                                                                                                                             
. . . .  The 2011 and 2013 Harmonization amend-
ments made one major substantive change; they 
“un-cabined” fiduciary duty.  UPA (1997) § 404 
had deviated substantially from UPA (1914) by 
purporting to codify all fiduciary duties owed by 
partners.  This approach had a number of prob-
lems.  Most notably, the exhaustive list of fiduciary 
duties left no room for the fiduciary duty owed by 
partners to each other—i.e., “the punctilio of an 
honor the most sensitive.” Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 
N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).  Although UPA (1997) 
§ 404(b) purported to state “[a] partner’s duty of 
loyalty to the partnership and the other partners” 
(emphasis added), the three listed duties each pro-
tected the partnership and not the partners. 
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 cmt. (2006) (amended 2013). 
81 See generally MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 47, ch. 8 (providing an in-depth discussion 
of remedies for oppression). 
82 Although breach of fiduciary duty is considered an equitable cause of action, see, e.g., 
MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 47, § 8.01, at 8-7, the availability of a buyout as a remedy 
is much less established in the fiduciary duty case law than it is in the oppression area.  
See, e.g., Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (Mass. 2006) (rejecting a buyout award 
in a breach of fiduciary duty action); see also MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 47, § 
8.02[B][1], at 8-17 (noting that “[a] buyout is the most common remedy for oppres-
sion”). 
83 See, e.g., MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 47, § 7.01[C][1]–[2], at 7-22 to 7-30. 
84 See, e.g., Douglas K. Moll, Of Donahue and Fiduciary Duty: Much Ado About . . . ?, 33 W. 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 471, 491 (2011) (noting that “under traditional corporate law prin-
ciples, employment and management positions are not ordinarily viewed as part of 
one’s rights as a shareholder; thus, terminations of employment and removals from 
management do not generally invoke a fiduciary duty analysis”); see also Berman v. Phys-
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3.  Other Dissolution Grounds 
Perhaps the smaller number of LLC statutes with oppression-
related dissolution provisions can be explained by the inclusion of other 
judicial dissolution grounds that are broad enough to encompass oppres-
sive conduct.  For example, and as mentioned, fifty-four statutes provide 
for dissolution when it not reasonably practicable to carry on the busi-
ness in conformity with the LLC’s governing documents.85  In some sit-
uations, this language might be useful to combat oppressive conduct, 
such as when the majority is denying the minority certain financial or 
participatory rights that are promised in the certificate or operating 
agreement.  Such guaranteed rights are rare,86 however, and the statutory 
language seems too indirect to squarely deal with the myriad forms of 
oppressive behavior.87  Indeed, the case law addressing the language has 
                                                                                                                             
ical Med. Assocs., 225 F.3d 429, 433 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that “any injury caused by 
the termination decision itself would be an injury to his interests as an employee, not as 
a stockholder”). 
85 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
86 Cf. Moll, supra note 3, at 952–56 (arguing that the typical member of an LLC is un-
likely to effectively contract for protection from abusive majority conduct). 
87 See, e.g., In re Seneca Investments LLC, 970 A.2d 259, 263 (Del. Ch. 2008) (stating 
that, under the Delaware judicial dissolution statute, “the inquiry must focus on wheth-
er it is now impracticable for Seneca [the LLC] to fulfill its business purpose”); id. (“Pe-
titioner argues that dissolution is proper because Seneca has failed to comply with cer-
tain provisions of the Operating Agreement that allegedly require, among other things, 
that the Company make certain cash distributions, provide reports to the Company's 
stockholders, and continue to allow Tierney to serve as a director.  Even assuming that 
Seneca is in violation of some provisions of its operating agreement, such violations are 
not grounds for this Court to order dissolution of an LLC.  The role of this Court in 
ordering dissolution under § 18-802 is limited, and the Court of Chancery will not at-
tempt to police violations of operating agreements by dissolving LLCs.”); cf. Dennis S. 
Karjala, Planning Problems in the Limited Liability Company, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 455, 471 
(1995) (“[I]n [some states], a court may order dissolution in an action by a member if it 
is established that it is ‘not reasonably practicable to carry on the business’ according to 
the articles or an operating agreement.  Yet it is often possible to carry on the business 
while freezing a minority interest out of any return.” (footnote omitted)). 
As to the “myriad forms of oppressive behavior,” see MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 
47, § 7.01[C][8], at 7-44 & n.106 (noting that “oppressive conduct can present itself in a 
wide variety of forms”). 
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focused more on the frustration of the company’s purpose than on the 
unfair treatment of a minority member.88   
Some statutes provide for dissolution when there is member con-
duct that makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s 
business with that member.89  Perhaps that language could be used by a 
court to provide a remedy against an oppressive majority whose behavior 
is repeatedly abusive towards minority owners.  Unfortunately, only sev-
en statutes include such language.90  The ability to dissolve when “other 
circumstances render dissolution equitable” could certainly be used to 
remedy oppressive majority conduct, but that ground is only present in 
one statute.91 
At bottom, while it is possible that other judicial dissolution 
grounds might be used to remedy oppressive conduct in the LLC, the 
“fit” of some of this language is questionable.  Moreover, some of the 
more appealing grounds are simply not present in enough statutes.  Giv-
en that a sizable body of oppression case law (on both liability and reme-
dy issues) already exists,92 it seems somewhat pointless to make litigants 
and courts reinvent the wheel.  Put differently, an explicit judicial disso-
lution ground for oppressive conduct seems more effective than compel-
ling litigants and courts to stretch other grounds to cover oppressive be-
havior. 
 
                                                     
88 See supra notes 35–37, 87 and accompanying text. 
89 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
90 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.  In addition, five of these seven statutes 
(Hawaii, Montana, South Carolina, West Virginia, and ULLCA) also provide an oppres-
sion-related dissolution provision.  Under these statutes, therefore, the “not reasonably 
practicable to carry on the company’s business with that member” ground is not serv-
ing as a substitute for an oppression-related provision.  
91 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
92 See generally MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 47, ch. 7 (providing an in-depth discussion 
of the oppression doctrine); id. ch. 8 (providing an in-depth discussion of remedies for 
oppression). 
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4.  The Vagueness of the Oppression Doctrine 
Perhaps the smaller number of oppression-related dissolution 
provisions in the LLC context stems from a disapproval of the oppres-
sion doctrine itself.  In many jurisdictions, oppression is defined in terms 
that require courts to ascertain whether there has been “burdensome, 
harsh and wrongful conduct” or a frustration of the minority’s “reasona-
ble expectations.”93  Such terms may be considered too vague to guide 
business owners and to produce consistent judicial results.  The smaller 
number of oppression-related statutes, therefore, may be due to a con-
scious legislative rejection of the oppression doctrine in the LLC setting. 
A few responses might be made to this argument.  First, the 
number of jurisdictions with oppression-related dissolution statutes in 
the corporation setting has not decreased.94  If conscious legislative rejec-
tions of the doctrine were occurring, one would expect to see changes in 
the corporation statutes as well.  Second, and as mentioned, a sizable 
body of oppression case law exists that helps to mitigate any perceived 
vagueness or uncertainty surrounding the doctrine.95  Third, the oppres-
sion doctrine seems no more vague than the notion of a fiduciary duty of 
loyalty owed to individual members, which many jurisdictions embrace.96  
Such manager-to-member or member-to-member duties are not defined 
by statute,97 and courts will likely define such duties in generalized “good 
                                                     
93 See, e.g., id. § 7.01[D][1][b][i], at 7-75 to 7-76. 
94 In fact, it has increased.  Effective January 1, 2015, Louisiana became the fortieth 
state in the country to provide statutory relief for oppressive conduct.  See Moll, supra 
note 51, at 462 & n.5. 
95 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
96 See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
97 See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 (2006); id. § 409 cmt. (stating that 
“it is impracticable to cabin all LLC-related fiduciary duties within a statutory formula-
tion,” and indicating that the act “codifies the core of the fiduciary duty of loyalty . . . 
but . . . does not purport to discern every possible category of overreaching”); REVISED 
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 (2006) (amended 2013); id. § 409 cmt. (stating that the 
statute “recognizes two core managerial duties but, unlike some earlier uniform acts, 
does not purport to state all managerial duties”). 
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faith”98 or “fairness”99 terms—terms that are arguably just as vague as 
“burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct” and “reasonable expecta-
tions.”   
CONCLUSION 
Judicial dissolution provisions in the LLC setting vary widely, alt-
hough the existence of modern uniform acts are likely to lessen these 
jurisdictional variations over time.  This article has attempted to catalog 
the statutory differences and to explore a few selected issues raised by 
the diverse approaches.  With respect to dissolution when it is not rea-
sonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the gov-
erning documents—the most common judicial dissolution ground—this 
article has argued that the impracticability of carrying on the business in 
conformity with either the certificate or the operating agreement should 
result in dissolution.  Nevertheless, there is confusion over which of the 
various statutory articulations reaches that result.  With respect to disso-
lution on the grounds of oppressive conduct, this article has provided 
some explanations for why oppression-related dissolution statutes are 
less common in the LLC setting than in the corporation context.  As 
states continue to reconsider their LLC statutes in light of the modern 
uniform acts, they may realize that their past elimination of exit rights 
has contributed to the present vulnerability of minority members.  As a 
result, the number of oppression-related dissolution provisions in the 
LLC setting will, ideally, increase.  
                                                     
98 See, e.g., VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, No. C.A. 17995, 2000 WL 1277372, at *1, 4–5 (Del. Ch. 
Aug. 31, 2000) (stating that managers owed a duty of loyalty to the LLC’s “investors,” 
and ultimately concluding that managers “failed to discharge their duty of loyalty . . . in 
good faith” (emphasis added)); infra note 99. 
99 Cf. STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 104.2 (2012) (stating 
that to comply with a fiduciary duty, the defendant must show, in part, that “the trans-
action[s] in question [was/were] fair and equitable to [Plaintiff],” and that “[Defendant] 
acted in the utmost good faith and exercised the most scrupulous honesty toward 
[Plaintiff]” (italics omitted)). 
 
 
Appendix 1 
Statutory Language 
 
State Citation Dissolution Ground(s) 
Alabama ALA. CODE § 10A-
5A-7.01  
 
See also § 10A-5A-
7.02 
“(d) On application by a member, the entry of an order dis-
solving the limited liability company on the grounds that it is 
not reasonably practicable to carry on the limited liability com-
pany’s activities and affairs in conformity with the limited lia-
bility company agreement, which order is entered by the circuit 
court for the county in which the limited liability company’s 
principal place of business within this state is located, and if the 
limited liability company does not have a principal place of 
business within this state then by the circuit court for the 
county in which the limited liability company’s most recent reg-
istered office is located.” 
 
Alaska ALASKA STAT. 
§ 10.50.405 
 
See also § 10.50.400 
“On application by or for a member of a limited liability com-
pany, the superior court may order the company dissolved if 
the court determines that it is impossible for the company to 
carry on the purposes of the company.” 
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 29-785 
 
“A. On application by or for a member, the superior court in 
the county in which the known place of business of the limited 
liability company is located may decree dissolution of a limited  
 
 
 
 See also § 29-781  
 
liability company on judicial determination of any of the fol-
lowing: 
1. It is not reasonably practicable to carry on the limited liability 
company business in conformity with an operating agreement. 
2. Unless otherwise provided in an operating agreement, the 
members or managers are deadlocked in the management of 
the limited liability company and irreparable injury to the lim-
ited liability company is threatened or being suffered or the 
business of the limited liability company cannot be conducted 
to the advantage of the members generally because of the dead-
lock. 
3. Unless otherwise provided in an operating agreement, the 
members or managers of the limited liability company have 
acted or are acting in a manner that is illegal or fraudulent with 
respect to the business of the limited liability company. 
4. Unless otherwise provided in an operating agreement, sub-
stantial assets of the limited liability company are being wasted, 
misapplied or diverted for purposes not related to the business 
of the limited liability company.” 
Arkansas ARK. CODE. ANN. 
§ 4-32-902  
 
See also § 4-32-901 
“On application by or for a member, a circuit court may decree 
dissolution of a limited liability company whenever it is not rea-
sonably practicable to carry on the business of the limited lia-
bility company in conformity with the operating agreement.” 
 
 
California CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 17707.03  
 
See also § 17707.01 
 
“(a) Pursuant to an action filed by any manager or by any mem-
ber or members of a limited liability company, a court of com-
petent jurisdiction may decree the dissolution of a limited lia-
bility company whenever any of the events specified in subdi-
vision (b) occurs. 
(b)(1) It is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business 
in conformity with the articles of organization or operating 
agreement. 
(2) Dissolution is reasonably necessary for the protection of 
the rights or interests of the complaining members. 
(3) The business of the limited liability company has been aban-
doned.  
(4) The management of the limited liability company is dead-
locked or subject to internal dissension. 
(5) Those in control of the limited liability company have been 
guilty of, or have knowingly countenanced, persistent and per-
vasive fraud, mismanagement, or abuse of authority.” 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 7-80-810  
 
See also § 7-80-801 
“(2) A limited liability company may be dissolved in a proceed-
ing by or for a member or manager of the limited liability com-
pany if it is established that it is not reasonably practicable to 
carry on the business of the limited liability company in con-
formity with the operating agreement of said company.” 
 
 
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 34-267 
“(a) A limited liability company is dissolved, and its activities 
and affairs must be wound up, upon the occurrence of any of 
the following:  
. . . 
(4) On application by a member, the entry by the Superior 
Court for the judicial district where the principal office of the 
limited liability company is located, or if none in this state, 
where its registered agent is located, of an order dissolving the 
company on the grounds that: (A) The conduct of all or sub-
stantially all of the company’s activities and affairs is unlawful; 
or (B) it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s 
activities and affairs; 
(5) On application by a member, the entry by the Superior 
Court for the judicial district where the principal office of the 
limited liability company is located, of an order dissolving the 
company on the grounds that the managers or those members 
in control of the company: (A) Have acted, are acting or will 
act in a manner that is illegal or fraudulent; or (B) have acted 
or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and was, is, or will 
be directly harmful to the applicant . . . .” 
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 6, § 18-802  
 
See also § 18-801 
“On application by or for a member or manager the Court of 
Chancery may decree dissolution of a limited liability company 
whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the busi-
ness in conformity with a limited liability company agreement.” 
 
 
District of 
Columbia 
D.C. CODE § 29-
807.01 
“(a) A limited liability company is dissolved, and its activities 
and affairs shall be wound up, upon the occurrence of any of 
the following:  
. . .  
(4) On application by a member, the entry by Superior Court 
of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that: 
(A) The conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s ac-
tivities and affairs is unlawful; or 
(B) It is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s 
activities and affairs in conformity with the certificate of organ-
ization and the operating agreement. 
(5) On application by a member, the entry by Superior Court 
of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that the 
managers or those members in control of the company: 
(A) Have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal 
or fraudulent; or 
(B) Have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and 
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant.” 
Florida FLA. STAT. 
§ 605.0702(1)  
 
 
“(b) In a proceeding by a manager or member if it is established 
that: 
1. The conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s ac-
tivities and affairs is unlawful; 
 
 
 
 See also 
§§ 605.0701, 
605.0705 
2. It is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s 
activities and affairs in conformity with the articles of organi-
zation and the operating agreement; 
3. The managers or members in control of the company have 
acted, are acting, or are reasonably expected to act in a manner 
that is illegal or fraudulent; 
4. The limited liability company’s assets are being misappropri-
ated or wasted, causing injury to the limited liability company, 
or in a proceeding by a member, causing injury to one or more 
of its members; or 
5. The managers or the members of the limited liability com-
pany are deadlocked in the management of the limited liability 
company’s activities and affairs, the members are unable to 
break the deadlock, and irreparable injury to the limited liability 
company is threatened or being suffered.” 
Georgia GA. CODE. ANN. 
§ 14-11-603 
 
See also § 14-11-
602(b) 
“(a) On application by or for a member, the court may decree 
dissolution of a limited liability company whenever it is not rea-
sonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with 
the articles of organization or a written operating agreement.” 
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 428-801 
“(4) On application by a member or a dissociated member, 
upon entry of a judicial decree that: 
(A) The economic purpose of the company is likely to be un-
reasonably frustrated; 
 
 
  (B) Another member has engaged in conduct relating to the 
company’s business that makes it not reasonably practicable to 
carry on the company’s business with that member; 
(C) It is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the 
company’s business in conformity with the articles of organi-
zation and the operating agreement; 
(D) The company failed to purchase the petitioner’s distribu-
tional interest as required by section 428-701; or 
(E) The managers or members in control of the company have 
acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppres-
sive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner . . . .” 
Idaho IDAHO CODE § 30-
25-701(a) 
“(4) On application by a member, the entry by the district court 
of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that: 
(A) The conduct of all or substantially all the company’s activ-
ities and affairs is unlawful; or 
(B) It is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s 
activities and affairs in conformity with the certificate of organ-
ization and the operating agreement; or 
(C) The managers or those members in control of the com-
pany: 
(i) Have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal 
or fraudulent; or 
(ii) Have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and 
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant . . . .” 
 
 
Illinois 805 ILL. COMP. 
STAT.  180/35-1(a) 
“(4) On application by a member or a dissociated member, 
upon entry of a judicial decree that: 
(A) the economic purpose of the company has been or is likely 
to be unreasonably frustrated; 
(B) the conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s ac-
tivities is unlawful; 
(C) it is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the 
company’s business in conformity with the articles of organi-
zation and the operating agreement. 
(5) On application by a member or transferee of a distributional 
interest, upon entry of a judicial decree that the managers or 
those members in control of the company: 
(A) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal 
or fraudulent; or 
(B) have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and 
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant.” 
Indiana IND. CODE § 23-
18-9-2  
 
See also § 23-18-9-
1.1 
“On application by or for a member, the circuit or superior 
court of the county in which the limited liability company’s 
principal office, or if there is none in Indiana, in which the reg-
istered office is located, may decree dissolution of the limited 
liability company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to 
carry on the business in conformity with the articles of organ-
ization or operating agreement.”  
 
 
Iowa IOWA CODE 
§ 489.701(1) 
“d. On application by a member, the entry by a district court 
of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that any of 
the following applies: 
(1) The conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s ac-
tivities is unlawful. 
(2) It is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s 
activities in conformity with the certificate of organization and 
the operating agreement. 
e. On application by a member or transferee, the entry by a 
district court of an order dissolving the company on the 
grounds that the managers or those members in control of the 
company have done any of the following: 
(1) Have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal 
or fraudulent. 
(2) Have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and 
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant.” 
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 17-76,117 
“(b) If the business of the limited liability company is suffering 
or is threatened with irreparable injury because the members 
of a limited liability company, or the managers of a limited lia-
bility company having more than one manager, are so dead-
locked respecting the management of the affairs of the limited 
liability company that the requisite vote for action cannot be 
obtained and the members are unable to terminate such dead-
lock, then any member or members in the aggregate owning at  
 
 
  least 25% of the outstanding interests in either capital or profits 
and losses in the limited liability company may file with the dis-
trict court a petition stating that such member or members de-
sire to dissolve the limited liability company and to dispose of 
the assets thereof in accordance with a plan to be agreed upon 
by the members or as determined by the district court in the 
absence of such agreement.” 
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 275.290 
 
See also § 275.285 
“(1) The Circuit Court for the county in which the principal 
office of the limited liability company is located, or, if none, in 
the county of the registered office, may dissolve a limited lia-
bility company in a proceeding by a member if it is established 
that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of 
the limited liability company in conformity with the operating 
agreement.”  
Louisiana LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 12:1335 
“On application by or for a member, any court of competent 
jurisdiction may decree dissolution of a limited liability com-
pany whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the 
business in conformity with the articles of organization or op-
erating agreement.” 
Maine ME. STAT. tit. 31, 
§ 1595(1) 
“D. On application by a member, the entry by the Superior 
Court of an order dissolving the limited liability company on 
the grounds that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the 
limited liability company’s activities in conformity with the lim-
ited liability company agreement; 
 
 
  E. On application by a member, the entry by the Superior 
Court of an order dissolving the limited liability company on 
the grounds that the members in control of the limited liability 
company have acted, are acting or will act in a manner that is 
illegal or fraudulent . . . .” 
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., 
CORPS. & ASS’NS 
§ 4A-903  
 
See also § 4A-902 
“On application by or on behalf of a member, the circuit court 
of the county in which the principal office of the limited liabil-
ity company is located may decree the dissolution of the limited 
liability company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to 
carry on the business in conformity with the articles of organ-
ization or the operating agreement.” 
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 156C, § 44  
 
See also § 43 
“On application by or for a member or manager the superior 
court department of the trial court may decree dissolution of a 
limited liability company whenever it is not reasonably practi-
cable to carry on its business in conformity with the certificate 
of organization or the operating agreement.” 
Michigan MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 450.4802 
 
See also § 450.4801 
“Upon application by or for a member, the circuit court for the 
county in which the registered office of a limited liability com-
pany is located may decree dissolution of the company when-
ever the company is unable to carry on business in conformity 
with the articles of organization or operating agreements.” 
Minnesota MINN. STAT. 
§ 322C.0701 
“(4) on application by a member, the entry by appropriate court 
of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that: 
 
 
 
  (i) the conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s activ-
ities is unlawful; or 
(ii) it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s 
activities in conformity with the articles of organization and the 
operating agreement; 
(5) on application by a member, the entry by appropriate court 
of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that the 
managers, governors, or those members in control of the com-
pany: 
(i) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal 
or fraudulent; or 
(ii) have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and 
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant . . . .” 
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 79-29-803 
“(1) On application by or for a member, the chancery court for 
the county in which the principal office of the limited liability 
company is located, or the Chancery Court of the First Judicial 
District of Hinds County, Mississippi, if the limited liability 
company does not have a principal office in this state, may de-
cree dissolution of a limited liability company: 
(a) Whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the 
business in conformity with the certificate of formation or the 
operating agreement; [or] 
(b) Whenever the managers or the members in control of the 
limited liability company have been guilty of or have knowingly  
 
 
  countenanced persistent and pervasive fraud or abuse of au-
thority, or the property of the limited liability company is being 
misapplied or wasted by such persons . . . .” 
Missouri MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 347.143  
 
See also § 347.137 
“2. On application by or for a member, the circuit court for the 
county in which the registered office of the limited liability 
company is located may decree dissolution of a limited liability 
company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on 
the business in conformity with the operating agreement.” 
Montana MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 35-8-902 
“(1) On application by or for a member or a dissociated mem-
ber, a district court may order dissolution of a limited liability 
company, or other appropriate relief, when: 
(a) the economic purpose of the company is likely to be unrea-
sonably frustrated; 
(b) another member has engaged in conduct relating to the 
company’s business that makes it not reasonably practicable to 
carry on the company’s business with that member remaining 
as a member; 
(c) it is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the 
company’s business in conformity with the articles of organi-
zation and the operating agreement; 
(d) the company failed to purchase the petitioner’s distribu-
tional interest as required by 35-8-805; or 
 
 
 
  (e) the members or managers in control of the company have 
acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppres-
sive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner.” 
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-147(a) 
“(4) on application by a member, the entry by the district court 
of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that: 
(A) the conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s ac-
tivities is unlawful; or 
(B) it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s 
activities in conformity with the certificate of organization and 
the operating agreement; or 
(5) on application by a member, the entry by the district court 
of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that the 
managers or those members in control of the company: 
(A) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal 
or fraudulent; or 
(B) have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and 
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant.” 
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 86.495 
“1. Upon application by or for a member, the district court may 
decree dissolution of a limited-liability company whenever it is 
not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of the com-
pany in conformity with the articles of organization or operat-
ing agreement.” 
New  
Hampshire 
N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 304-C:134 
“I. Unless the operating agreement provides otherwise, upon 
application by a member, the superior court may decree the  
 
 
  dissolution of a limited liability company in any of the follow-
ing circumstances: 
(a) It is not reasonably practicable for the limited liability com-
pany to carry on its business. 
(b) A voting deadlock has occurred among the members and, 
upon the occurrence of the deadlock, the members have been 
unable to break the deadlock; and because of the deadlock, ei-
ther irreparable injury to the limited liability company is threat-
ened or being suffered or the limited liability company’s busi-
ness and internal affairs can no longer be conducted to its ad-
vantage. 
. . . 
III. A member shall have the right to apply to the superior 
court to decree the dissolution of a limited liability company, 
and the superior court may issue such a decree, in any of the 
following circumstances: 
(a) The limited liability company has procured its certificate of 
formation through fraud. 
(b) The limited liability company has exceeded or abused its 
lawful authority under this act. 
(c) The limited liability company has carried on, conducted, or 
transacted its business in a persistently fraudulent or illegal 
manner. 
 
 
 
  (d) The limited liability company has abused its power contrary 
to the public policy of the state.” 
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 42:2C-48(a) 
“(4) on application by a member, the entry by the Superior 
Court of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that: 
(a) the conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s ac-
tivities is unlawful; or 
(b) it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s 
activities in conformity with one or both of the certificate of 
formation and the operating agreement; or 
(5) on application by a member, the entry by the Superior 
Court of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that 
the managers or those members in control of the company: 
(a) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal 
or fraudulent; or 
(b) have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and 
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant.” 
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 53-19-40 
“On application by or for a member, a court may decree dis-
solution of a limited liability company whenever it is not rea-
sonably practicable to carry on its business in conformity with 
its articles of organization or operating agreement.”  
New York N.Y. LTD. LIAB. 
CO. LAW § 702 
“On application by or for a member, the supreme court in the 
judicial district in which the office of the limited liability com-
pany is located may decree dissolution of a limited liability 
company whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on  
 
 
  the business in conformity with the articles of organization or 
operating agreement . . . .” 
North  
Carolina 
N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 57D-6-02 
“The superior court may dissolve an LLC in a proceeding 
brought by either of the following:  
. . .   
(2) A member, if it is established that (i) it is not practicable to 
conduct the LLC’s business in conformance with the operating 
agreement and this Chapter or (ii) liquidation of the LLC is 
necessary to protect the rights and interests of the member.”  
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE. 
§ 10-32.1-50(1) 
“d. On application by a member, the entry by appropriate court 
of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that: 
(1) The conduct of all or substantially all of the activities of the 
company are unlawful; or 
(2) It is not reasonably practicable to carry on the activities of 
the company in conformity with the articles of organization 
and the operating agreement; 
e. On application by a member, the entry by appropriate court 
of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that the 
managers, governors, or those members in control of the com-
pany: 
(1) Have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal 
or fraudulent; or 
(2) Have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and 
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant.” 
 
 
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 1705.47 
“On application by a member of a limited liability company, 
the tribunal may declare a limited liability company dissolved, 
and the limited liability company’s business shall be wound up 
upon the occurrence of any of the following events: 
(A) An event that makes it unlawful for all or substantially all 
of the business of the limited liability company to be continued, 
but a cure of illegality within ninety days after notice to the 
limited liability company of the event is effective retroactively 
to the date of the event for purposes of this section; 
(B) A determination by the tribunal that any of the following is 
true: 
(1) The economic purpose of the limited liability company is 
likely to be unreasonably frustrated. 
(2) Another member has engaged in conduct relating to the 
limited liability company’s business that makes it not reasona-
bly practicable to carry on the business with that member. 
(3) It is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the 
limited liability company’s business in conformity with the op-
erating agreement.” 
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. tit. 
18, § 2038 
“On application by or for a member, the district court may de-
cree dissolution of a limited liability company whenever it is 
not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conform-
ity with the articles of organization or operating agreement.” 
 
 
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 63.661 
“(2) In a proceeding by or for a member if it is established that 
it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of the 
limited liability company in conformance with its articles of or-
ganization or any operating agreement.” 
Pennsylvania 15 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 8871(a) 
“(4) On application by a member, the entry by the court of an 
order dissolving the company on the grounds that: 
(i) the conduct of all or substantially all the company’s activities 
and affairs is unlawful; 
(ii) it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s 
activities and affairs in conformity with the certificate of organ-
ization and the operating agreement; or 
(iii) the managers or those members in control of the company: 
(A) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal 
or fraudulent; or 
(B) have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and 
was, is or will be directly harmful to the applicant.” 
Rhode Island 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 7-16-40 
“On application by or on behalf of a member, the superior 
court may decree dissolution of a limited liability company 
whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the busi-
ness in conformity with the articles of organization or operat-
ing agreement.” 
South  
Carolina 
S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 33-44-801 
“(4) on application by a member or a dissociated member, 
upon entry of a judicial decree that: 
  
 
 
  (a) the economic purpose of the company is likely to be unrea-
sonably frustrated; 
(b) another member has engaged in conduct relating to the 
company’s business that makes it not reasonably practicable to 
carry on the company’s business with that member; 
(c) it is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the 
company’s business in conformity with the articles of organi-
zation and the operating agreement; 
(d) the company failed to purchase the petitioner’s distribu-
tional interest after giving effect to provisions of the operating 
agreement modifying or superseding the provisions of Section 
33-44-701; or 
(e) the managers or members in control of the company have 
acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is unlawful, op-
pressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner 
. . . .” 
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 47-34A-
801(a) 
“(4) On application by a member or a dissociated member, 
upon entry of a judicial decree that: 
(i) The economic purpose of the company is likely to be unrea-
sonably frustrated; 
(ii) Another member has engaged in conduct relating to the 
company’s business that makes it not reasonably practicable to 
carry on the company’s business with that member; 
 
 
 
  (iii) It is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the 
company’s business in conformity with the articles of organi-
zation and the operating agreement; or 
(iv) The managers or members in control of the company have 
acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal or fraud-
ulent.” 
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 48-245-902 (LLC 
formed before 
1/1/06) 
 
TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 48-249-617 (LLC 
formed 1/1/06 or 
later) 
“(a) On application by the attorney general and reporter or by 
or for a member, the court may decree dissolution, winding up 
and termination of an LLC whenever it is not reasonably prac-
ticable to carry on the business in conformity with the articles 
and/or the operating agreement.” 
 
“(a) Judicial Decree. On application by the attorney general and 
reporter, or by or for a member, the court may decree dissolu-
tion, winding up and termination of an LLC whenever it is not 
reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity 
with the LLC documents.” 
Texas TEX. BUS. ORGS. 
CODE ANN. 
§ 11.314 
“A district court in the county in which the registered office or 
principal place of business in this state of a domestic partner-
ship or limited liability company is located has jurisdiction to 
order the winding up and termination of the domestic partner-
ship or limited liability company on application by an owner of 
the partnership or limited liability company if the court deter-
mines that:  
 
 
  . . . 
(3) it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the entity’s busi-
ness in conformity with its governing documents.” 
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 48-3a-701 
“(4) on application by a member, the entry by the district court 
of an order dissolving the limited liability company on the 
grounds that: 
(a) the conduct of all or substantially all of the limited liability 
company’s activities and affairs is unlawful; or 
(b) it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the limited liabil-
ity company’s activities and affairs in conformity with the cer-
tificate of organization and the operating agreement; 
(5) on application by a member, the entry by the district court 
of an order dissolving the limited liability company on the 
grounds that the managers or those members in control of the 
limited liability company: 
(a) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal 
or fraudulent; or 
(b) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is oppres-
sive and was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant 
. . . .”  
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
11, § 4101(a) 
“(4) on application by a member, the entry by the Superior 
Court of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that: 
(A) the conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s ac-
tivities is unlawful; or 
 
 
  (B) it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s 
activities in conformance with the certificate of organization 
and the operating agreement; or 
(5) on application by a member, the entry by the Superior 
Court of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that 
the managers or those members in control of the company: 
(A) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal 
or fraudulent; or 
(B) have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and 
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant.” 
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 13.1-1047 
“A. On application by or for a member, the circuit court of the 
locality in which the registered office of the limited liability 
company is located may decree dissolution of a limited liability 
company if it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the busi-
ness in conformity with the articles of organization and any 
operating agreement.” 
Washington WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 25.15.274 
“On application by a member or manager the superior courts 
may order dissolution of a limited liability company whenever: 
(1) It is not reasonably practicable to carry on the limited lia-
bility company’s activities in conformity with the certificate of 
formation and the limited liability company agreement; or (2) 
other circumstances render dissolution equitable.” 
West Virginia W. VA. CODE 
§ 31B-8-801(b) 
“(5) On application by a member or a dissociated member, 
upon entry of a judicial decree that: 
 
 
  (i) The economic purpose of the company is likely to be unrea-
sonably frustrated; 
(ii) Another member has engaged in conduct relating to the 
company’s business that makes it not reasonably practicable to 
carry on the company’s business with that member; 
(iii) It is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the 
company’s business in conformity with the articles of organi-
zation and the operating agreement; 
(iv) The company failed to purchase the petitioner’s distribu-
tional interest as required by section 7-701; or 
(v) The managers or members in control of the company have 
acted, are acting or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppres-
sive, fraudulent or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner . . . .” 
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. 
§ 183.0902 
“In a proceeding by or for a member, the circuit court for the 
county where the limited liability company’s principal office, 
or, if none in this state, its registered office, is or was last lo-
cated may order dissolution of a limited liability company if any 
of the following is established: 
(1) That it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business 
of the limited liability company. 
(2) That the limited liability company is not acting in conform-
ity with an operating agreement. 
(3) That one or more managers are acting or will act in a man-
ner that is illegal, oppressive or fraudulent. 
 
 
  (4) That one or more members in control of the limited liability 
company are acting or will act in a manner that is illegal, op-
pressive or fraudulent. 
(5) That limited liability company assets are being misapplied 
or wasted.” 
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 17-29-701(a) 
“(iv) On application by a member, the entry of a court order 
dissolving the company on the grounds that: 
(A) The conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s ac-
tivities is unlawful; or 
(B) It is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s 
activities in conformity with the articles of organization and the 
operating agreement; or 
(v) On application by a member or dissociated member, the 
entry of a court order dissolving the company on the grounds 
that the managers or those members in control of the com-
pany: 
(A) Have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal 
or fraudulent; or 
(B) Have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and 
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant.” 
Prototype 
LLC Act 
PROTOTYPE LTD. 
LIAB. CO. ACT 
§ 902 (1992)  
“On application by or for a member, the [designate the appro-
priate court] may decree dissolution of a limited liability com-
pany whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the  
 
 
  business of the limited liability company in conformity with the 
operating agreement.” 
Revised Pro-
totype LLC 
Act 
REVISED PROTO-
TYPE LTD. LIAB. 
CO. ACT § 706 
(2011) 
“(e) on application by a member, the entry by the [appropriate 
court] of an order dissolving the limited liability company on 
the grounds that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the 
limited liability company’s activities in conformity with the lim-
ited liability company agreement.”  
ULLCA UNIF. LTD. LIAB. 
CO. ACT § 801 
(1996) 
“(4) on application by a member or a dissociated member, 
upon entry of a judicial decree that:   
(i) the economic purpose of the company is likely to be unrea-
sonably frustrated; 
(ii) another member has engaged in conduct relating to the 
company’s business that makes it not reasonably practicable to 
carry on the company’s business with that member; 
(iii) it is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the 
company’s business in conformity with the articles of organi-
zation and the operating agreement; 
(iv) the company failed to purchase the petitioner’s distribu-
tional interest as required by Section 701; or 
(v) the managers or members in control of the company have 
acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppres-
sive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner . . . .” 
RULLCA REVISED UNIF. 
LTD. LIAB. CO.  
“(4) on application by a member, the entry by [appropriate 
court] of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that:   
 
 
 ACT § 701(a) 
(2006) 
(A) the conduct of all or substantially all of the company’s ac-
tivities is unlawful; or 
(B) it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s 
activities in conformity with the certificate of organization and 
the operating agreement; or 
(5) on application by a member, the entry by [appropriate 
court] of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that 
the managers or those members in control of the company:   
(A) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal 
or fraudulent; or 
(B) have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and 
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant.” 
RULLCA 
(2013) 
REVISED UNIF. 
LTD. LIAB. CO. 
ACT § 701(a)  
(2006) (Amended 
2013) 
“(4) on application by a member, the entry by [the appropriate 
court] of an order dissolving the company on the grounds that:  
(A) the conduct of all or substantially all the company’s activi-
ties and affairs is unlawful; 
(B) it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s 
activities and affairs in conformity with the certificate of organ-
ization and the operating agreement; or 
(C) the managers or those members in control of the company:  
(i) have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal 
or fraudulent; or 
(ii) have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and 
was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant . . . .”  
 
Appendix 2 
Data Summary 
 
 
1. Purpose of the company cannot be accomplished   10 statutes 
 
a. Impossible to carry on the purposes of the company  
AK        
 
b. Economic purpose likely to be unreasonably frustrated 
HI IL MT OH SC SD WV ULLCA 
 
c. Business has been abandoned  
CA        
 
 
2. Not reasonably practicable to carry on the business  54 statutes (WI listed twice) 
in conformity with the governing documents 
 
a. Not reasonably practicable to carry on business in conformity with the LLC agree-
ment/operating agreement 
AL AZ AR CO DE KY ME MO 
OH WI Proto-
type 
Revised 
Prototype 
    
b. Not reasonably practicable to carry on business in conformity with the articles of organiza-
tion OR operating agreement 
CA GA IN LA MA MD MI MS 
        
NJ NM NV NY OK OR RI TN 
“one or 
both” 
      “and/or”;  
“in con-
formity 
with the 
LLC docu-
ments,” de-
fined as ei-
ther or 
both 
c. Not reasonably practicable to carry on business in conformity with the articles of organiza-
tion AND operating agreement 
DC FL HI IA ID IL MN MT 
        
ND NE PA SC SD TX UT VA 
     “in con-
formity 
with its 
governing 
docu-
ments” 
  
VT WA WV WY ULLCA RULLCA RULLCA 
(2013) 
 
 
d. Not reasonably practicable to carry on business in conformity with the operating agree-
ment and this Chapter 
NC        
e. Not reasonably practicable to carry on business  
CT NH WI      
  also LLC 
“not acting 
in con-
formity 
with an 
operating 
agree-
ment” 
     
 
 
3. Member or manager deadlock      5 statutes 
 
AZ CA FL KS NH    
4. Unlawful, illegal, or fraudulent conduct by    29 statutes 
members, managers, or company  
 
AZ CA CT DC FL HI IA ID 
 also mis-
manage-
ment 
ground 
   manag-
ers and 
members 
only 
  
IL ME MN MS MT ND NE NH 
 members 
in control 
only 
 persis-
tent and 
perva-
sive 
fraud or 
abuse of 
authority 
manag-
ers and 
mem-
bers 
only 
  LLC pro-
cured cer-
tificate 
through 
fraud; or 
exceeded its 
lawful au-
thority un-
der the Act; 
also persis-
tently 
fraudulent 
or illegal 
conduct 
NJ OH PA SC SD UT VT WI 
 unlawful 
for the 
business 
of the 
LLC to 
be contin-
ued 
     managers 
and mem-
bers only 
WV WY ULLCA RULLC
A 
RULLC
A 
(2013) 
   
managers 
and mem-
bers only 
 managers 
and mem-
bers only 
     
 
 
5. Waste or misapplication of assets     4 statutes  
 
AZ FL MS WI     
 
6. Oppression        24 statutes (CA listed twice) 
 
a. Conduct that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner  
CT DC HI IA ID IL MN MT 
ND NE NJ PA SC UT VT WI 
WV WY ULLCA RULLCA RULLCA 
(2013) 
   
 
b. Dissolution necessary to protect rights or interests of complaining member  
CA NC       
“rights or 
interests” 
“rights and 
interests” 
      
 
c. Abuse of authority by managers or members  
CA MS       
 persistent 
and perva-
sive fraud 
or abuse 
of author-
ity 
      
 
7. Member conduct that makes it not reasonably   7 statutes 
practicable to carry on the company’s business  
with that member 
 
HI MT OH SC SD WV ULLCA  
 
 
8. Failure to purchase petitioner’s distributional    5 statutes 
interest when required       
 
HI MT SC WV ULLCA    
 
 
9. Other circumstances render dissolution equitable   1 statute  
 
WA        
 
 
10. LLC has abused its power contrary to public    1 statute 
policy of this state    
 
NH        
 
